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Abstract
In the current Internet, there is no clean way for affected
parties to react to poor forwarding performance: when a
domain violates its Service Level Agreement (SLA) with
a contractual partner, the partner must resort to ad-hoc
probing-based monitoring to determine the existence and
extent of the violation. Instead, we propose a new, system-
atic approach to the problem of forwarding-performance
verification. Our mechanism relies on voluntary report-
ing, allowing each domain to disclose its loss and delay
performance to its customers and peers. Most impor-
tantly, it enables verifiable performance measurements,
i.e., domains cannot abuse it to significantly exaggerate
their performance. Finally, our mechanism is tunable, al-
lowing each participating domain to determine how many
resources to devote to it independently (i.e., without any
inter-domain coordination), exposing a controllable trade-
off between performance-verification quality and resource
consumption. Our mechanism comes at the cost of de-
ploying modest functionality at the participating domains’
border routers; we show that it requires reasonable re-
sources, well within modern network capabilities.
1 Introduction
The lack of a systematic method for estimating the perfor-
mance of Internet service providers (ISPs) is a well known
problem: when an ISP does not perform as expected,
there is no clean way for the affected parties to detect
the problem so they can debug it, ask for compensation
if a Service-Level Agreement (SLA) has been violated,
or simply learn from it (e.g., re-assess a peering agree-
ment with an under-performing neighbor). This lack of
information makes network debugging difficult and slow,
even leading ISPs to deny their failures to their customers
and peers, pointing fingers at one another. One could at-
tribute this situation to the best-effort nature of the Inter-
net which, by definition, provides no a-priori guarantees.
Yet that is no reason not to expect useful, after-the-fact in-
formation about ISP performance—actually, it makes per-
fect sense to expect such information in a best-effort en-
vironment like the Internet, where communication quality
often relies on quick failure detection and on choosing the
right providers and peers.
Since ISPs offer no explicit interface for their cus-
tomers and peers to verify their performance, the latter
can only resort to probing tools like traceroute or other ac-
tive measurements. Moreover, researchers have recently
started to combine probing from multiple vantage points
(e.g., PlanetLab nodes) to gain information about ISP per-
formance that would not be accessible through simple
probing [14, 13]. This information is typically extracted
from channels with a different purpose (e.g., ICMP traf-
fic), because probing mechanisms are designed under the
assumption that ISPs would never freely provide honest
information about their performance.
But what if ISPs were willing to export an explicit in-
terface through which their performance can be queried?
In this work, we ask the question, how should we design
such an interface such that it provides accurate and ver-
ifiable information, while it can be implemented using
a reasonable, tunable amount of resources? On the one
hand, we find this to be an interesting thought experiment.
On the other hand, we identify two strong, albeit perhaps
unintuitive, reasons why an ISP may willingly expose its
performance problems to the outside world.
First, ISPs often need to exchange performance infor-
mation anyway with their customers and peers, in order
to handle customer complaints. When a customer calls
her ISP to complain that she cannot reach a certain des-
tination, the ISP needs to know whether the problem lies
in its own local network, the customer’s network, the net-
work of the peer that is handling traffic to that destination,
or the destination’s network—because each of these cases
warrants a different response. Today, this information is
acquired by ISP operators in a reactive, ad-hoc manner,
which means that it takes time to resolve each complaint,
potentially leaving customers dissatisfied. It makes sense
that an ISP would prefer to collaborate with its customers
and peers and willingly exchange troubleshooting reports
with them, provided that it can trust these reports to be
accurate and honest.
Second, it makes sense that an ISP would prefer to
report its own performance rather than have its perfor-
mance evaluated by untrusted entities, through potentially
inaccurate mechanisms. Probing or other edge-based
“black-box” mechanisms typically run on coalitions of
end-systems like PlanetLab; the ISP has no reason to trust
these, and they can provide no guarantee for the accuracy
of their measurements. If an ISP’s performance is to be
talked about anyway, an accurate, trusted self-reporting
mechanism may be preferable to the ISP, because, at least,
it provides the ISP with control over the quality and quan-
tity of the information that is revealed about its business.
1
Self-reporting is not necessarily better or worse than
edge-based probing; each approach has different pros and
cons. On the one hand, while probing is effective for
localizing persistent outages or high-rate drop patterns,
it provides no reliable indicator of the fate of non-probe
traffic: probes can be treated differently, either by de-
sign (e.g., ICMP packet responses are generated off the
fast path of routers), or by “strategic thinking” (treating
probe packets preferentially to improve externally per-
ceived performance). On the other hand, whereas probing
is simple and requires no changes in ISPs, a self-reporting
mechanism by necessity requires some extra complexity
in the control- and data-plane mechanisms of the Inter-
net’s forwarding fabric.
In the rest of the paper, we describe a self-reporting
mechanism for verifiable network-performance measure-
ments (or VPM, for brevity). According to VPM, each
ISP’s loss and delay performance is cooperatively esti-
mated by the ISP itself and the other network domains
(customers and peers) that carry its traffic. Its key fea-
tures are: (1) It enables accurate estimation of ISP perfor-
mance, without revealing any information about the in-
ternal structure or routing policies of ISPs beyond what
is already publicly available through BGP routing tables.
(2) ISPs cannot abuse it to significantly exaggerate their
performance. (3) It allows each ISP to choose its own
cost/quality trade-off independently from others, yet in
a way that does not compromise the verifiability of the
derived measurements. These features come at the cost
of deploying new functionality at the participating do-
mains’ border routers, but we show that the correspond-
ing memory, processing, and bandwidth requirements are
well within the capabilities of modern networks.
We start, in Section 2, with a high-level description of
our approach, followed by a more precise problem state-
ment and our assumptions. Section 3 explains why ex-
isting protocols or straightforward combinations of ex-
isting techniques fail to provide an appropriate solution.
Section 4 describes what kind of information VPM col-
lects and disseminates among participating domains. Sec-
tions 5 and 6 describe how VPM provides independent
tunability of resource expenditure at different domains
while still achieving high quality of information. Sec-
tion 7 evaluates VPM experimentally and through back-
of-the-envelope calculations, in terms of its overhead and
information quality provided. Section 8 discusses partial
deployment and related work, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Setup
In this section, we first describe our approach at a high
level (§2.1), then provide a more concrete problem state-
ment (§2.2) and state our assumptions (§2.3).
We will use the following terminology. A “domain”
is a contiguous network that falls under one administra-
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Figure 1: Circles represent administrative domains. The num-
bered boxes represent HOPs. The black arrow represents a HOP
path. Our main example scenario throughout the paper: domain
S sends to domain D a packet set S = {p1, p2, ...} via HOPs 1
to 8.
tive entity; in the current Internet, a domain would re-
fer to an edge network or a single Autonomous System
(AS). Each domain has hand-off points (or HOP s) along
its perimeter; these are ingress/egress points, where traf-
fic enters/exits the domain’s jurisdiction (see Figure 1 for
examples). Each HOP is connected to a neighboring do-
main’s HOP through an inter-domain link; such a link is
considered faulty when it introduces loss or delay beyond
a known specification. We are in particular interested in
packets traversing the same HOP path, i.e., the same se-
quence of HOPs; we name such paths according to their
source and destination routing prefixes (that is, origin pre-
fixes as advertised in BGP).
2.1 Approach
In VPM, each domain monitors traffic at its HOPs and
produces receipts for the traffic that enters and exits its
network. For privacy reasons, a receipt is made avail-
able only to the domains that observed the corresponding
traffic. For instance, if any of the domains in Figure 1
produces a receipt for a set of packets {p1, p2, ...} that
crossed domains S, L, X , N , and D, the receipt is made
available only to these particular 5 domains. To ensure
this, each HOP classifies observed traffic per HOP path
and produces a common receipt only for packets that fol-
lowed the same HOP path. This implies that when a HOP
observes two packets p1 and p2, the HOP knows (in prac-
tice, can guess with a high probability) whether the two
packets belong to the same HOP path (see Assumption #1
below).
Each domain X collects receipts from its neighbors
with the purpose of estimating each neighbor’s loss and
delay performance with respect to its traffic. Moreover,
domain X collects receipts from the other domains that
observed its traffic with the purpose of verifying the cor-
rectness of its neighbors’ receipts. The idea is that if a
neighbor provides incorrect receipts to exaggerate its own
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performance (e.g., claim that it delivered traffic that it ac-
tually dropped), these “dishonest” receipts will be incon-
sistent with the receipts of the other domains on the path.
We do not worry, in this paper, about how or when re-
ceipts are disseminated (see Assumption #2 below). A
domain could request receipts periodically (e.g., once an
hour or once a day) or arrange to receive them in real time,
as they are generated. Collecting receipts from all other
domains that handle a domain’s traffic may sound like
overkill at first—and it would be, if receipts were pro-
duced per packet or per flow. However, in VPM, receipts
are produced at coarser granularity, such that each domain
incurs, due to receipts, less than 0.1% overhead over the
traffic it observes (§7).
Instead, we focus on the content of the receipts. We
ask the question, if domains were willing to provide re-
ceipts on the traffic they receive and deliver, what should
these receipts consist of, such that (i) they can be gener-
ated using a reasonable, tunable amount of resources and
(ii) neighbors can use them to estimate and verify each
other’s performance?
Threat Model We assume the existence of both honest
domains that construct their receipts exactly as our pro-
tocol specifies and lying domains that construct their re-
ceipts using incomplete or fabricated information. Our
threat model allows lying domains to collude with others
towards a common nefarious goal. Nevertheless, a lying
domain can observe only network traffic that appears lo-
cally (because it originates at, terminates at, or transits
that domain), or that has been observed by its colluding
domains.
We do not consider, in this paper, the scenario where
domains modify observed traffic. This is not because this
scenario is not plausible or not interesting, but because
it is, to the best of our knowledge, further from current
ISP practices (than introducing loss or unpredictable de-
lay and denying performance problems). Moreover, as we
will see, dealing with loss and delay without considering
traffic modification is already a challenging enough prob-
lem to warrant separate treatment.
2.2 Problem Statement
Consider a path P , like the one pictured in Figure 1. Sup-
pose that each HOP inP can disseminate a certain amount
of information to all other HOPs in P . The question is,
what should this information be, such that the following
conditions are met:
1. Computability As long as domain X in path P pro-
duces honest information,X’s neighbors inP can use that
information to compute the loss and delay introduced by
X in the traffic flowing along P .
Regarding delay, we are interested in delay quantiles,
e.g., domainL should be able to determine that domainX
introduced delay below 5msec to 90% of the traffic with
a certain (high) probability pi. We are interested in quan-
tiles, not delay averages, because a domain may exhibit
low average delay at the time scale of seconds or min-
utes, yet introduce “spikes” of high delay that can impact
the performance of TCP or real-time applications signifi-
cantly [17].
2. Verifiability If domainX in pathP produces dishon-
est information, its neighbors in P can detect and discard
that information.
3. Tunability The amount of resources consumed in
collecting and disseminating information is locally tun-
able by each HOP, such that the accuracy of the statistics
computed from this information degrades gracefully with
the amount of resources spent to collect and disseminate
it.
2.3 Assumptions
In addition to our threat model, we make the following
assumptions:
(1) Our strongest assumption is that the HOP path over
which traffic between the same source and destination ori-
gin prefix is routed changes only slowly (i.e., on the order
of hours, rather than seconds). This is largely the case
today for domain-level paths over short time scales. Note
that this does not restrict how a domain load-balances traf-
fic internally. Each domain is free to split traffic through
multiple internal paths in any way it wants, as long as it
forwards all traffic with the same source/destination pre-
fixes via the same egress link.
(2) We assume that there exists a way for a domain in
path P to disseminate receipts to all other domains in P ,
such that the authenticity and integrity of each received re-
ceipt is guaranteed. One way of realizing this assumption
would be for each domain to make its receipts available at
an administrative web-site and accessible over HTTPS. It
is possible to design more efficient dissemination mecha-
nisms, but that is outside the scope of this paper.
(3) Finally, we assume that each domain has some
network equipment (routers or other middleboxes) that
can perform at wire speed simple per-packet operations.
Those include packet timestamp generation, arithmetic
calculations or digest computations on packet headers and
a small portion of packet payload, and modification of lo-
cal state in a buffer. This assumption is well justified by
current trends in production routers, as well as the increas-
ing focus of academia and industry on programmable
routers and switches [18, 7].
3 Why a New Protocol
There already exist many good techniques for measuring
network performance [8, 20, 12, 15]. So, instead of de-
scribing VPM from scratch, we first build, in this section,
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“obvious” solutions by combining or extending existing
techniques, and describe why each of these solutions fails
to meet the three conditions of our problem statement. We
close with an overview of VPM and how it relates to the
existing techniques.
3.1 Strawman
As a first-cut, strawman solution, we consider the fol-
lowing modest extension to the Packet Obituaries pro-
tocol [3]: Each HOP produces a receipt for every sin-
gle packet it observes. A receipt consists of a digest for
the corresponding packet and the timestamp for when the
packet was observed. Each receipt is made available to all
the domains that observed the packet.
Computability The strawman easily meets this condi-
tion, as a receipt collector in possession of all the (honest)
receipts generated by a domain X can determine whether
each packet that entered X was dropped within X and, if
not, by how much it was delayed within X . By combining
such information for multiple packets, the receipt collec-
tor can easily compute aggregate loss statistics and delay
quantiles for X .
Verifiability The strawman also meets this condition:
To hide a loss or delay incident, a domain has to falsely
put the blame for the incident on one of its neighbors,
which results in inconsistent claims between the two do-
mains. For instance, suppose domain X receives packet
p from domain L but drops it before delivering it no do-
main N . If X is dishonest and wants to hide the fact that
it dropped p, it can put the blame on N , i.e., falsely claim
having delivered p to N . This claim will be inconsistent
with N ’s claim of not having received p.
Such an inconsistency can be due either to a lie or to
a faulty inter-domain link. If a receipt collector receives
inconsistent claims from two neighbors, it discards the
corresponding receipts (from both neighbors) and noti-
fies both of them of the inconsistency. The two involved
neighbors can then debug their inter-domain link; if it is
functioning correctly, then the inconsistency was due to
a lie, and the lying domain is exposed to the neighbor it
implicated. For instance, if X falsely reports having de-
livered packet p to N , but N correctly reports not having
received p, the rest of the world cannot determine whether
X or N is lying, but N does know that X is the liar.
A domain can always support a lying neighbor’s claims,
but then it either has to take itself the blame for the liar’s
loss/delay or falsely accuse another domain down the
path. For instance, if X falsely claims having delivered
p to N , N has the option of coveringX’s lie (by claiming
that it indeed received p), but then it has to claim either
that it lost p itself, or that it delivered p to D—in which
case N is exposed to D as a liar.
It is important to note that the strawman meets the ver-
ifiability constraint, only because each receipt collector
collects receipts from all HOPs on the path, and computes
the performance of all domains. If, instead, each receipt
collector collected receipts only from a segment of the
path, then there would be no incentive for domains to be
honest about their neighbors’ performance. For instance,
suppose domain L wants to compute domain X’s perfor-
mance but collects receipts only from HOPs 3, 4, and 5.
Suppose domainX drops packet p and falsely claims hav-
ing delivered p to N . In this case, N can safely cover X’s
lie, i.e., claim having received p. Since domainL does not
collect receipts beyond HOP 5, it has no way of comput-
ingN ’s performance and verifying it againstD’s receipts.
Hence,N can collude withX and cover its lie without any
harm to its own reputation.
Tunability This is where the strawman fails. The cost of
maintaining and propagating per-packet receipts, though
not intractable, can be expensive in buffering space, pro-
cessing, and reporting bandwidth. Different domains may
have different resources they are willing to devote to
a self-reporting endeavor, and keeping per-packet state
leaves no room for tuning.
3.2 Trajectory Sampling ++
Since the main problem with the strawman is the non-
tunable cost of collecting and exchanging per-packet state,
the first solution that comes to mind is to sample, i.e., col-
lect information not on all packets, but on a representative
subset, and use it to infer statistics for the rest. Hence, we
next consider a combination of the strawman and Trajec-
tory Sampling [8] (we call it “Trajectory Sampling ++”).
Each HOP applies a uniform hash function to a small,
fixed portion of each observed packet. If the outcome ex-
ceeds a pre-configured threshold, then the packet is sam-
pled and the HOP produces a receipt for it. Each pair of
HOPs from the same domain use the same hash function
and sampling threshold, hence sample the same packets.
Each receipt is made available to all the domains that ob-
served the corresponding packet.
Computability This condition is met, both for loss and
delay statistics. First, a receipt collector in possession
of all the (honest) receipts produced by a domain X can
count how many of the sampled packets were lost within
X ; from that, it can estimate how many packets were lost
within X overall, as shown in [20]. Similarly, the receipt
collector can compute the delay incurred by each sam-
pled packet within X , then estimate delay quantiles for
the overall traffic [20].
Verifiability This is where Trajectory Sampling ++
fails, and we will argue that this failure is inherent to any
sampling-based solution.
The obvious problem with sampling is that a domain
can lie about its performance by biasing the sampling pro-
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cess. Since a domain’s performance is estimated based on
how it treats the sampled packets, if domain X treats the
sampled packets preferentially (i.e., assigns them to high-
priority queues), then X’s estimated performance will be
higher than its actual performance.
On a first thought, such cheating seems easy to detect,
as long as not all HOPs sample the same packets. We il-
lustrate with an example. Suppose HOPs 4 and 5 from
Figure 1 sample one set of packets, s1, whereas HOPs 3
and 6 sample a different set of packets, s2. Suppose do-
main L wants to estimate domain X’s performance and
collects receipts from all HOPs. First, L uses the receipts
from HOPs 4 and 5 to estimate the loss and delay in-
curred between these two HOPs. Similarly, L uses the
receipts from HOPs 3 and 6 to estimate the loss and delay
incurred between them. If the two sets of statistics do not
match (e.g., the estimated loss between HOPs 4 and 5 is
significantly lower than the estimated loss between HOPs
3 and 6), then: either one or both of the involved inter-
domain links are malfunctioning, or domain X is biasing
its samples to exaggerate its performance, or domain N
is biasing its samples to misrepresent X’s performance.
Hence, one could argue, as long as not all HOPs sample
the same packets (hence, not all HOPs have a reason to
bias the same traffic), we can get similar incentives with
the strawman, i.e., lies lead to inconsistencies, and liars
are exposed to their neighbors.
The main problem with this argument is that it assumes
that domain X (i.e., HOPs 4 and 5) treats the packets
from set s1 preferentially, but the packets from s2 nor-
mally (like the rest of the traffic); yet there is a clear incen-
tive here for domains X and N to collude and treat both
sets of sampled packets preferentially, such that they make
consistent claims, and the statistics computed from their
receipts overestimate the performance of both of them.
There are also other problems, less fundamental, but po-
tentially significant in practice: This approach requires
HOPs from different domains (in our example, HOPs 3
and 6) to agree to sample the same packets. Moreover,
an “inconsistency” is now a difference in a probabilistic
estimate—not a concrete disagreement about a particular
packet as in the strawman.
To conclude, when each domain’s performance is es-
timated based on how it treats sampled packets, then a
sequence of interconnected domains have an incentive to
collude and bias the samples taken by all of them. In
contrast, when domains provide receipts for every single
packet, there is no incentive for such misbehavior, because
colluding with a neighbor to cover the neighbor’s failures
necessarily means taking the blame yourself.
An explanation of why the “Secure Sampling” tech-
nique from [12] does not address this problem can be
found in Section 8.
3.3 Difference Aggregator ++
An alternative way of introducing tunability in the straw-
man is to aggregate, i.e., collect information not for in-
dividual packets, but for groups of packets. The bene-
fit of aggregation versus sampling is that each domain
produces information that depends on all the packets it
observes, hence there is no straightforward way to cheat
by treating certain packets preferentially. Hence, we next
consider the following combination of the strawman and
Lossy Difference Aggregator1 [15] (we call it “Difference
Aggregator ++”).
Each HOP breaks the sequence of observed pack-
ets from a given path into packet aggregates, where a
“packet aggregate” is a set of consecutively observed
packets. For example, if a HOP observes packet sequence
〈p1, p2, p3, p4, p5〉2 from path P , it may break that into
two aggregates {p1, p2, p3} and {p4, p5}. For each aggre-
gate, the HOP computes a packet count and an average
timestamp, and stores them in a receipt, together with an
identifier for the aggregate. Each receipt is made available
to all domains that observed the corresponding aggregate.
Moreover, each pair of HOPs from the same domain
try to break the observed traffic into the same set of ag-
gregates. A classic approach is to use common “cutting
points”: Each HOP applies a uniform hash function to a
small, fixed portion of each observed packet. If the out-
come is larger than a pre-configured threshold, then the
packet is considered a “cutting point” and starts a new
packet aggregate. If two HOPs use the same hash function
and cutting threshold, and there is no packet re-ordering
between them, then the two HOPs end up breaking the
observed traffic into the same set of packet aggregates.
Computability Difference Aggregator ++ fails to meet
the computability condition in two ways. First, it can-
not provide meaningful statistics in the face of packet re-
ordering. Second, even if there is no packet reordering, it
cannot provide sufficient information for estimating delay
quantiles—only for computing loss and estimating aver-
age delay.
Let’s assume, temporarily, that there is no packet re-
ordering within domain X . In this case, a receipt collec-
tor in possession of the (honest) receipts produced by X
can compute the loss incurred by each packet aggregate
α within X , by comparing the packet counts collected for
α at HOPs 4 and 5. By combining such information for
multiple aggregates, one can precisely compute the loss
incurred by the overall traffic within X . Less obviously,
by taking into account only the aggregates that did not in-
cur any packet loss, one can estimate the average delay
1We could have equally considered a combination of the strawman
and the “Secure Sketch” technique from [12]. The conclusion would
have been the same. For a comparison with that work, see Section 8.
2In reality, a HOP would observe infinite packet sequences. In our
examples, we use finite sequences for simplicity.
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incurred by the overall traffic within X [15].
On the other hand, there isn’t sufficient information for
computing delay quantiles for domain X , i.e., we cannot
make statements of the form “90% of the packets incurred
delay below 10msec within X .” The only technique that
we are aware of for computing delay quantiles for a do-
main requires knowing the delay incurred by individual
packets within that domain [20]. Intuitively, this makes
sense: An extreme example of a delay quantile is the max-
imum delay incurred by a packet aggregate within X . Un-
like average delay, maximum delay cannot be computed
without collecting per-packet information at the entrance
and exit of X .
Now let’s assume that there is packet reordering within
domain X . In this case, the receipt collector cannot even
compute the loss and average delay incurred within X ,
because there is no guarantee that HOPs 4 and 5 will break
observed traffic into the same aggregates.
3.4 Recap
A simple protocol (like the strawman), where each do-
main produces receipts for each packet it receives and de-
livers, provides sufficient information for computing and
verifying each domain’s loss/delay performance; how-
ever, the amount of resources required to store, process,
and report per-packet state is (significantly) more than a
typical domain can afford today. An aggregation-based
protocol (like Difference Aggregator ++), where each do-
main produces per-aggregate receipts, introduces tunable
cost, but is susceptible to packet reordering and does
not provide sufficient information for estimating delay
quantiles—only for computing loss and estimating aver-
age delay. Finally, a sampling-based protocol (like Trajec-
tory Sampling ++), where each domain produces receipts
for sampled packets, does provide sufficient information
for estimating loss and delay quantiles and introduces tun-
able cost, yet is susceptible to sampling bias.
3.5 VPM Overview
VPM employs both sampling and aggregation—sampling
to provide probabilistic delay-quantile measurements and
aggregation to provide precise loss measurements.
VPM’s sampling component shares elements with Tra-
jectory Sampling ++ (HOPs produce receipts for a subset
of observed packets and choose which packets to sam-
ple using hash functions), but prevents sampling bias in
the following way. The sampling function is keyed using
future traffic, making the samples unpredictable. Specif-
ically, a domain does not know whether it will have to
report measurements on a particular packet until after it
has forwarded that packet to its downstream neighbor. As
a result, an unscrupulous domain has no way to decide
whether to “sugarcoat” its performance by preferentially
treating particular packets.
VPM’s aggregation component shares elements with
Difference Aggregator ++ (HOPs produce receipts for
packet aggregates and choose where to break each aggre-
gate using hash functions), but provides accurate statistics
in the face of packet reordering. This is achieved by pro-
viding, on top of per-aggregate receipts, extra per-packet
information for a small window around the cutting points
between packet aggregates.
One could ask, why use both sampling and aggrega-
tion? After all, using sampling we can estimate both loss
and delay quantiles (provided we fix the sample bias is-
sue), so why use aggregation at all? One reason is that
aggregation provides precise (as opposed to probabilistic)
loss measurements and, as we will see, once we have de-
ployed the sampling component, the incremental cost of
adding the aggregation component is trivial. Another rea-
son is to add extensibility to our mechanism. Even though
we do not consider this scenario in this paper, “bad” ISP
behavior may consist not only of introducing loss and un-
predictable delay, but also of modifying traffic; the only
way to detect such behavior is to use a content-processing
technique like the one proposed in [12], which could be
easily incorporated in our aggregation component, but not
in a sampling-only mechanism.
4 Voluntary Reporting
In this section, we describe what kind of information
VPM domains produce and how that information is used
to estimate and verify their performance. We do not worry
about how this information is generated—we defer that to
the next two sections.
Traffic Receipts Each VPM HOP generates receipts for
the traffic it observes. There are two kinds of receipts:
1. A receipt for a set of sampled packets has form
R = 〈PathID , Samples〉.
2. A receipt for a packet aggregate has form
R = 〈PathID ,AggID ,PktCnt〉.
PathID specifies the HOP path to
which the corresponding sampled packets
or packet aggregate belongs. It has form
〈HeaderSpec,PreviousHOP ,NextHOP,MaxDiff 〉.
HeaderSpec specifies which part of a packet’s headers is
used to identify the packet’s path; it includes at least a
source and destination origin-prefix pair. PreviousHOP
and NextHOP specify the previous and next HOPs on
this path. MaxDiff is a value agreed upon between the
reporting HOP and the HOP that is at the other end of the
same inter-domain link (e.g., HOPs 3 and 4 in Figure 1).
It is meant to lower-bound the difference in timestamps
one should expect between the two HOPs.
Samples is a sequence of 〈PktID ,Time〉 records, each
corresponding to a single sampled measurement. The
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packet identifier PktID is a digest of the packet’s head-
ers. Time specifies when the corresponding packet was
observed at the HOP. The aggregate identifierAggID con-
sists of the packet IDs of the first and last packets of the
aggregate. PktCnt is the number of packets observed by
the HOP within this aggregate.
Upon receiving a packet, each HOP classifies it into
a HOP path and an aggregate, counts it against that ag-
gregate’s packet count, and decides whether to sample it.
Periodically, the HOP generates traffic receipts for all the
sampled packets and aggregates it has observed since the
last reporting time, which it disseminates to all domains
that observed the corresponding traffic.
Receipt-based Statistics Consider HOPs 4 and 5 in
Figure 1 and suppose we collect all their receipts. We
now describe the types of statistics we can compute from
these receipts.
Suppose HOPs 4 and 5 use the same sampling algo-
rithm, i.e., if one HOP samples a packet p, the other HOP
also samples p (provided p is not lost before reaching the
HOP). If the two HOPs generate for p receipts Rp
4
and
Rp
5
, respectively, then the packet’s delay through X was
Rp
5
.Time − Rp
4
.Time . By computing the delay experi-
enced by the sampled packets within X , we can estimate
upper and lower bounds for the delay experienced by all
packets within X [20].
Now suppose HOPs 4 and 5 use the same aggregation
algorithm. If the two HOPs generate for the same packet
aggregateα receiptsRα4 andRα5 , respectively, thenX lost
Rα
4
.PktCnt −Rα
5
.PktCnt packets of the aggregate.
Receipt Combination Receipts of either kind can be
combined with others from the same HOP to generate re-
ceipts of a larger sample set or coarser aggregate. For
sampling receipts combination is straightforward:
⊎iRi =
〈
PathID ,
⋃
i
Samples i
〉
For aggregate receipts, consider N consecutive aggre-
gates, αi, i = 1..N , from the same path, and the N
receipts, Rαi = 〈PathID ,AggID i,PktCnt i〉, produced
for these aggregates by a single HOP. We define the com-
bination of these receipts as
⊎iRi =
〈
PathID ,AggID ,
∑
i
PktCnt i
〉
where AggID is the identifier (first and last packet digest)
of the union of all N aggregates.
Receipt Consistency Consider two receipts, Rp
5
and
Rp
6
, for the same sampled packet p, produced by two
HOPs on opposite ends of the same inter-domain link
(e.g., HOPs 5 and 6, in Figure 1). The two receipts are
considered consistent with each other when all of the fol-
lowing hold:
Rp
5
.PathID .MaxDiff = Rp
6
.PathID .MaxDiff (1)
Rp
6
.Time −Rp
5
.Time ≤ Rp
5
.PathID .MaxDiff (2)
These rules express the fact that a correct inter-domain
link does not introduce unpredictable delay: the time at
which a sampled packet is delivered by one HOP and re-
ceived by the other should differ at most by a predictable
MaxDiff , set during configuration of that link by the two
involved domains.
Now consider two receipts, Rα
5
and Rα
6
, for the same
packet aggregate α, produced by two HOPs on opposite
ends of the same inter-domain link. The two receipts are
considered consistent with each other when:
R5.PktCnt = R6.PktCnt
This rule represents the fact that a correct inter-domain
link does not introduce packet loss—hence, the number of
packets delivered by one HOP and received by the other
should be the same.
If a receipt collector gets inconsistent receipts from
two neighbors, it discards both receipts and notifies both
neighbors of the inconsistency, such that the liar is ex-
posed to the neighbor it implicated, as in the strawman
(§3.1).
(No) Clock Synchronization VPM does not require
that HOPs have synchronized clocks. However, it is to
a participating domain’s best interest to keep its HOPs
reasonably synchronized (e.g., at the granularity of a mil-
lisecond, achievable with NTP [5]), since its delay perfor-
mance will be estimated based on the timestamps reported
by different HOPs. Moreover, it is to two neighboring do-
mains’ best interest to keep adjacent HOPs (like 3 and
4 in Figure 1) reasonably synchronized, otherwise their
timestamp difference will exceed the reported MaxDiff
and the two neighbors will generate inconsistent receipts
(hence appear to have a problematic inter-domain link or
be involved in a lie).
We should note that domains are free to report arbitrar-
ily large MaxDiff values: nothing prevents HOPs 3 and
4 from keeping de-synchronized clocks and reporting a
MaxDiff of several seconds between them. That, how-
ever, does make it look like they are connected through
an awfully slow inter-domain link—not a good feature to
advertise to their customers and peers.
5 Bias-resistant, Tunable Sampling
We now describe how each HOP chooses which pack-
ets to sample. Our sampling algorithm prevents domains
from exaggerating their performance by biasing their sam-
ples (§5.1), while it maximizes the number of packets that
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Algorithm 1 DelaySample(p, µ, σ)
Input p // new packet
Input µ // marker threshold
Input σ // sampling threshold
Initially TempBuffer ← ∅ // packet buffer
Initially R← ∅ // current receipt
1: if Digest(p) > µ then
2: for all packets q in TempBuffer do
3: if SampleFcn(Digest(q),Digest(p)) > σ
then
4: Add 〈Digest(q),Time(q)〉 to R.Samples
5: Empty TempBuffer
6: Add 〈Digest(p),Time(p)〉 to R.Samples
7: else
8: Add Digest(p) to TempBuffer
are commonly sampled by all HOPs that observe them,
while allowing each HOP to choose its own sampling
rate (§5.2), even in the face of loss and packet reordering
(§5.3).
5.1 Bias Resistance
Instead of sampling packets in real time, each HOP main-
tains state on all observed packets, but only for a fixed,
short period of time (ten milliseconds or so). After that
period of time has elapsed, the HOP is told which of the
stored per-packet state to keep and which to discard. Since
an ISP learns whether a packet’s fate will affect estimates
of its performance only after it has forwarded that packet,
it cannot treat sampled packets preferentially.
A dishonest HOP could, in theory, store every single
packet, wait to learn whether the packet has to be sam-
pled, then decide how to treat the packet. However, that
means delaying all traffic at the HOP by ten milliseconds
or so (an order of magnitude above the delay introduced
by a correctly functional router)—not to mention that it re-
quires buffering ten milliseconds’ worth of traffic, which,
for a 10Gbps interface would require 25MB (i.e., several
chips) of expensive SRAM storage.
A key question is who tells each HOP which packets
to delay-sample. A naïve approach would be to use ex-
plicit signaling; for example, in Figure 1, domain S could
explicitly tell all HOPs in path P which packets to sam-
ple from each aggregate sent from S to D along P . That,
however, would essentially require every source domain
to set up virtual circuits along all Internet paths that ob-
serve its traffic. Instead, each HOP decides whether to
delay-sample a packet based on the contents of another
packet sent later on the same path. In this sense, domainS
implicitly dictates which of its packets should be sampled,
through the traffic it subsequently routes via P anyway.
Algorithm 1 shows what happens when a HOP observes
a new packet p from path P ; the algorithm assumes that
the HOP maintains a temporary buffer with per-packet
state for all the packets observed fromP . If the packet sat-
isfies a certain condition, it is chosen as a “marker” packet
(line 1). In that case, its contents determine which of the
already observed packets to sample (lines 2–4) discarding
the rest (line 5). The marker packet itself is also sampled
(line 6). Observe that HOPs maintain state for all packets
only during the short period of time until the next marker
packet is observed.
The marker value µ, which determines which pack-
ets are “markers,” is a system-wide constant specified by
VPM at design time; when there is no loss, all HOPs in
P select the same packets as markers. In contrast, the
sampling threshold σ, which determines which packets
are sampled, is a local parameter, chosen independently
at each HOP. If all HOPs in P choose the same σ, they
all sample the same packets (modulo the packets that are
lost). We turn next to what happens when different HOPs
select different sampling thresholds.
5.2 Tunability
Each HOP chooses its own sampling rate. At the same
time, given N HOPs observing the same packet sequence
and their sampling rates, we maximize the number of
packets that are commonly sampled by all HOPs.
The key element that enables this property is the in-
equality in line 3 of Algorithm 1: Consider HOPs 1
and 2, with sampling thresholds σ1 and σ2 < σ1.
Suppose that p is a packet sampled by HOP 1 and q
is the first marker packet observed after p by HOP 1.
Since HOP 1 samples p, this necessarily means that
SampleFcn(Digest(q),Digest(p)) > σ1 > σ2, which
means that HOP 2 also samples p; hence, HOP 2 samples
at least all packets sampled by HOP 1. So, even though
each HOP chooses its sampling rate independently, if
there is no packet loss or reordering, different HOPs never
sample partially overlapping packet sets.
5.3 Sampling Under Loss and Reordering
Loss and reordering decrease the number of commonly
sampled packets. E.g., if a marker packet get lost be-
tween two HOPs, it causes them to sample arbitrarily
different packet sets for several milliseconds—until the
next marker arrives. The good news is that it takes un-
likely amounts of (non-purposeful) loss/reordering to sig-
nificantly impact the estimation accuracy of the mecha-
nism. For instance, in Section 7, we show that, if HOPs
4 and 5 sample 1% of the observed traffic, and the link
between them experiences 25% packet loss, the delay be-
tween the two HOPs can still be estimated with an accu-
racy of 2msec. This accuracy is sufficient for verifying
today’s SLAs, which typically promise intra-domain de-
lays on the order of multiple tens of milliseconds [1].
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An under-performing domain (sayX in Figure 1) could
drop all marker packets, causing the next domain (N in
our example) to sample all the wrong packets; this would
ensure that X’s performance is never verified according
to N ’s receipts. First, note that such behavior from X
is detrimental to N (because it prevents it from produc-
ing correct receipts), hence N has a clear incentive to ex-
pose and stop it. Second, such behavior is bound to be
exposed, because marker packets are expected to be al-
ways sampled and reported on: if X drops a marker q, it
either has to admit dropping it or lie and be inconsistent
with N ’s claim that it never received q; either way, if X
consistently drops markers, it is either globally exposed
as misbehaving or locally exposed as such to N .
6 Tunable Aggregation
We now describe how each HOP chooses which pack-
ets to assign to the same aggregate. Like our sampling,
our aggregation is “tunable,” i.e., we allow each HOP to
choose its own degree of aggregation, according to the lo-
cally available resources. This raises the following chal-
lenge: when HOPs aggregate differently, they produce
receipts on different aggregates; how can one combine
such receipts to estimate domain performance and per-
form consistency checking? We first describe this chal-
lenge in more detail (§6.1), then present our solution in
two parts—first assuming no loss or reordering (§6.2),
then removing this assumption (§6.3).
Terminology and Notation: We borrow the follow-
ing terminology and notation from set theory (illustrated
through the examples of Table 1):
1. A partition of a packet set S is a set of non-overlapping
aggregates whose union is equal to S. Given a par-
tition A of some packet set, each packet that is the
first packet of an aggregate in A is called a cutting
point. For example, p1 and p3 are cutting points in
A = {{p1, p2}, {p3, p4}}.
2. Suppose A1 and A2 are partitions of the same packet
set. We say that A1 is coarser than A2 (or A2 is finer
than A1), denoted by A1 ≥ A2, when each aggregate
in A1 is a union of aggregates in A2.
More formally, we say that A1 ≥ A2, when:
∃{βi|βi ∈ A2} :
⋃
i βi = α, ∀α ∈ A1.
3. Suppose Ai, i = 1..N , is a partition of packet set S.
We say that J is the join of A1,A2, ...AN , denoted
by J = Join(A1,A2, ...AN ), when J is the finest
partition of S that is coarser than all Ai.
More formally, we say that
J = Join(A1,A2, ...AN ), when:
J ≤ J ′ ∀J ′ : J ′ ≥ Ai ∀ i,
where J ′ is also a partition of S.
A1 = {{p1}, {p2}, {p3}, {p4}}
A2 = {{p1, p2}, {p3, p4}} ≥ A1 Join(A1,A2) = A2
A3 = {{p1}, {p2, p3}, {p4}} ≥ A1 Join(A2,A3) = A4
A′3 = {{p1}, {p2}, {p3, p4}} ≥ A2 Join(A2,A
′
3) = A2
A4 = {{p1, p2, p3, p4}} ≥ A2,A3
Table 1: Different partitions of packet set S = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
and some join examples. Note that not all partitions of S have
a “≥” relationship, e.g., we cannot say that A2 ≥ A3 nor that
A3 ≥ A2.
6.1 The Partitioning Problem
If we view all traffic sent on path P as a packet set S,
then we can say that each HOP in P that performs packet
aggregation computes a partition of S.
When two HOPs produce different aggregate sets from
the same packet set, a domain that collects their re-
ceipts cannot directly perform consistency checking as de-
scribed in Section 4. However, it can try to find traffic
receipts from one HOP that, when combined, exactly cor-
respond to traffic receipts (and aggregates) from the other
HOP, and then proceed with the calculations and verifica-
tion from Section 4. This corresponds to computing the
join of the two aggregate sets as defined above to find the
finest aggregate set over which statistics can be computed
across the receipts from the two HOPs.
For instance, suppose two HOPs observe packet set S
from Table 1 and, respectively, produce aggregate sets A2
andA3 (from the same table). A domain that collects their
receipts can combine each HOP’s receipts and produce the
receipt that the HOP would have produced for the (single)
aggregate in aggregate set A4. So, the two HOPs’ claims
can be checked for consistency only with respect to the
aggregates in the coarser aggregate set Join(A2,A3) =
A4.
Although this approach is general—there is always a
join of two aggregate sets over which a verifier can com-
pute some combined receipts and, therefore, some per-
formance statistics—the quality of the results varies. In-
tuitively, we would want the join of fine-grained aggre-
gate sets to be just as fine-grained; otherwise informa-
tion obtained and forwarded at high resource cost would
end up lost in translation. In the example above, the join
of A2 and A3 is A4, a single-aggregate aggregate set,
even though the input aggregate sets and traffic receipts
afforded multiple data points each from either HOP. In
contrast, an equally “expensive” aggregate set A′3 from
the second HOP, would have allowed the verifier to com-
pare receipts on Join(A2,A′3) = A2, which conserves all
information from the first HOP and only combines two of
the three receipts from the second one.
Our goal then is: to design a partitioning algorithm that
results in the finest possible join given the rate at which
each HOP can produce new aggregates.
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Algorithm 2 Partition(p, δ)
Input p // new packet
Input δ // partition threshold
Initially R = ∅ // current receipt
1: if Digest(p) > δ then
2: Close receipt R for aggregateR.AggID
3: Open new receipt R ← ∅
4: R.AggID .FirstPacketID ← p
5: R.AggID .LastPacketID ← p
6: R.PktCnt ←R.PktCnt + 1
6.2 Basic Solution
At a high level, VPM limits domains’ choice of packet ag-
gregation so as to produce “good” aggregates with respect
to join and combination, while allowing them to tune how
fine their choice is.
Algorithm 2 shows what happens when a HOP observes
a new packet p from path P ; the algorithm assumes that
the HOP maintains one “open” receipt per path. If the
packet’s contents satisfy a certain condition (line 1), then
the current aggregate for path P is closed (line 2) and the
packet is classified in a new aggregate (line 4); otherwise,
the packet is classified in the current aggregate (line 5).
Observe that this algorithm requires constant state per ag-
gregate and constant computation per packet (i.e., its state
size and per-packet computation are not proportional to
aggregate size).
Algorithm 2 ensures that HOP 2 with partition
threshold δ2 will partition a stream at least at the same
points as HOP 1 with partition threshold δ1 > δ2.
So, even though each HOP chooses its partitioning
rate independently, if there is no loss or reordering,
different HOPs never produce partially overlapping
aggregate sets. For instance, if HOPs 1 and 2 from
Figure 1 observe packet sequence 〈p1, p2, ...p8〉 and
have partition thresholds δ1 > δ2, they may respectively
produce aggregate sets {{p1, p2, p3, p4}, {p5, p6, p7, p8}}
and {{p1, p2}, {p3, p4}, {p5, p6}, {p7, p8}},
but not {{p1, p2, p3, p4}, {p5, p6, p7, p8}} and
{{p1}, {p2, p3}, {p4, p5}, {p6, p7}, {p8}}.
6.3 Partitioning Under Loss and Reordering
Loss can decrease the fine-ness of the join of the pro-
duced aggregate sets: Suppose HOPs 1 and 2 pro-
duce aggregate sets {{p1, p2, p3, p4}, {p5, p6, p7, p8}}
and {{p1, p2}, {p3, p4}, {p5, p6}, {p7, p8}}; the join of
the two sets is {{p1, p2, p3, p4}, {p5, p6, p7, p8}} (the
coarsest of the two aggregate sets). However, if p5 is
lost before HOP 2, then the latter produces aggregate
set {{p1, p2}, {p3, p4, p5, p6}, {p7, p8}}; now, the join of
the two sets is {{p1, p2, p3, p4, p5, p6, p7, p8}} (the worst
possible in this example). So, loss can cause a combina-
tion of aggregates that would otherwise have been split
using the lost packet as a cutting point, which, in turn,
reduces the fine-ness of the join.
The good news is that, although loss does decrease the
fine-ness of the resulting join, the degradation is smooth,
because the probability of coarsening the granularity of a
measurement is conditioned on a cutting point being lost,
not on arbitrary packet loss and, even then, not all cut-
ting points can cause a violation of the total order when
lost. For instance, in Section 7, we show that, if HOPs
4 and 5 generate an aggregate receipt for every 100, 000
packets, and the link between them experiences 25% loss,
the loss between the two HOPs can still be computed
for every 150, 000 packets, on average. Note that being
able to compute domain loss at such granularity is more
than sufficient for verifying today’s SLAs, which typically
promise a certain level of packet loss per month (a dura-
tion that corresponds to billions of packets, assuming a
traffic rate of a few tens of Mbps along each path) [1].
Reordering can also decrease the fine-ness of the
join of the produced aggregate sets: Consider path
P from Figure 1 and original packet sequence Sˆ =
〈p1, p2, ...p8〉 sent along P . Suppose HOP 1 observes
this sequence and partitions it into aggregate set A =
{{p1, p2, p3, p4}, {p5, p6, p7, p8}}. HOP 4 observes se-
quence 〈p1, p2, p3, p5, p4, p6, p7, p8〉 due to reordering
somewhere between the two HOPs. Even though it uses
the same algorithm, it partitions the sequence into A′ =
{{p1, p2, p3}, {p5, p4, p6, p7, p8}}. The two aggregate
sets are not ordered according to the “finer than” relation,
so their join is the entire sequence, an undesirable effect
of reordering.
In practice, packets are reordered only when they are
transmitted close to one another (according to the most
recent Internet-wide experiment we are aware of, packets
transmitted more than half a millisecond apart were not re-
ordered [10]). Hence, we define, for each path P , a safety
inter-arrival threshold J and assume that two packets that
follow P can be reordered only if they are observed (at
any HOP) less than J time units away from one another.
This assumption allows us to bound the coarseness of the
join at the cost of keeping extra per-aggregate state.
At a high level, we alter the mechanism of Algorithm 2
to add patch up information in every receipt. A verifier
can use this patch up information to make “misaligned”
receipts from different HOPs align better, thereby en-
abling a better join of the corresponding aggregate sets
and consequently better-quality traffic statistics.
More specifically, a traffic receipt for a packet aggre-
gate also specifies the sequence of packets observed J
time units around the cutting point. In the above ex-
ample, HOP 1 reports sequence 〈p3, p4, p5, p6〉 in its re-
ceipt for the first aggregate, and HOP 4 reports sequence
〈p2, p3, p5, p4〉 in its receipt for the first aggregate. In gen-
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eral, a receipt is extended from the earlier definition to be
〈PathID ,AggID ,PktCnt ,AggTrans〉, where AggTrans
is the sequence of packet identifiers that correspond to the
packets observed within a window of 2J from the aggre-
gate’s last packet.
Using this information, the verifier can transform one
HOP’s receipts to match what the HOP would have gen-
erated, had it observed the same packet sequence with an-
other HOP. In our particular example, HOP 1 reports ob-
serving packet p4 before cutting point p5, while HOP 4
reports observing it after the cutting point. Consequently,
the verifier would transform HOP 4’s receipts by “migrat-
ing” p4 from the later to the earlier aggregate (i.e., decre-
menting the packet count of the former and incrementing
the packet count of the latter). With this transformation,
HOP 4’s receipts correspond to the same aggregates with
HOP 1’s receipts, hence the verifier can proceed with the
performance computation and verification of Section 4.
If adding per-packet state to aggregate receipts sounds
like too much overhead, take into account that a HOP is
supposed to choose how many packets to assign to each
aggregate according to its resources. E.g., a HOP may
choose to cover minutes’ worth of traffic with each aggre-
gate; in this case, including in each per-aggregate receipt
per-packet state for the few packets observed around the
end of the aggregate is significantly less expensive than
maintaining per-packet state. We quantify this per-packet
overhead in Section 7.
7 Evaluation
We now compute the resource overhead incurred by VPM
domains, and quantify the quality with which each do-
main’s performance is estimated.
We consider the case where HOP functionality is im-
plemented in border routers, as part of a NetFlow-like
monitoring platform that operates partly in the router’s
data-plane and partly in its control plane. The data-
plane part handles per-packet operations and collects per-
aggregate state in a monitoring cache; we refer to it as
the collector module. The control-plane part periodically
reads the state from the data-plane and performs further
processing; we refer to it as the processor module.
As a proof of concept, we implemented the collector
and processor modules in Click (although, in a real router,
the former would be implemented in hardware, close to
the router’s forwarding plane, e.g., as part of a NetFlow
engine). Our implementation uses the “Bob” hash func-
tion (because it has been shown to work well with Inter-
net traffic [19]) to compute packet digests and applies it
to each packet’s IP and transport headers. The collec-
tor’s monitoring cache is updated from traffic traces (as
opposed to actual network traffic). We used traces from a
Tier-1 ISP, provided by CAIDA.
7.1 Overhead
Memory and Processing The amount of memory and
processing resources needed for the processor module is
tunable. The processing module reads receipts from the
monitoring cache and prepares them for storage or dis-
semination. The rate at which new receipts appear in the
monitoring cache (hence need to be read and processed)
depends directly on the locally chosen sampling and par-
tition thresholds. Hence, a domain can directly control
the amount of memory and processing cycles spent by
the processing module by varying these two thresholds (a
demonstration of the resulting trade-off follows).
The collector module maintains state for each “active
path,” i.e., each source-destination origin-prefix pair that
is currently sending traffic through the specific HOP; this
per-path state consists at least of one “open” aggregate
receipt (a PathID , AggID , and PktCnt—roughly 20
bytes). E.g., if a HOP observes traffic from 100, 000 paths
at the same time, it needs a 2MB monitoring cache.
Moreover, the collector module maintains a temporary
packet buffer, where it stores 〈PktID ,Time〉 pairs (4 and
3 bytes, respectively) for all packets observed within J
time units. At first, this seems to be cause for concern—
what happens with high-rate paths that observe millions
of packets per second? In reality, however, the per-packet
state that needs to be kept is modest: Recall that J is our
“safety threshold”—when two packets are observed more
than J time units apart, we assume that they cannot be re-
ordered. A conservative choice is to set J to 10msec—an
order of magnitude above the millisecond threshold that
we need according to the latest Internet reordering mea-
surements we are aware of [10]. An OC-192 interface
observes at most 10Gbps. If we assume an average packet
size of 400B, 10Gbps corresponds to 3.125Mpps per di-
rection, which means that a HOP would need a 436KB
temporary buffer for each 10Gbps interface. Assuming an
(implausible) worst-case traffic of all minimum-size pack-
ets, 10Gbps correspond to 20Mpps per direction, which
means that a HOP would need a 2.8MB temporary buffer
for each 10Gbps interface. So, even assuming worst-case
traffic, the amount of buffering we need fits into a single
SRAM chip.
Finally, for each packet p, the collector looks up the
packet’s PathID ; computes Digest(p) and a timestamp;
updates the corresponding PktCnt ; and stores the di-
gest and timestamp to the temporary packet buffer. This
amounts to three memory accesses, one hash function, and
one timestamp computation per packet. Moreover, when-
ever a marker packet is observed, the HOP goes through
the temporary packet buffer and discards state for the
packets that are not delay-sampled, which adds one more
memory access per packet. Such processing, though not
currently supported by routers, is within the capabilities
of modern hardware and in line with the guidelines set by
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the IETF Packet Sampling group [6].
Bandwidth We have said that each domain makes each
receipt available to every other domain that observed the
corresponding traffic. Whether this happens pro-actively
(through a constant receipt stream) or on-demand (e.g.,
through a secure web interface), receipt dissemination in-
troduces, in each path, bandwidth overhead that depends
on (1) the number of HOPs on that path and (2) the rate at
which each of these HOPs produces receipts.
Again, this seems, at first, to be cause for concern—
one could argue that introducing bandwidth overhead that
grows with the total number of HOPs per path is not a
“scalable” approach. In practice, this dependence on the
number of HOPs is not a problem: Paths consist on aver-
age of 3–4 domains, hence 4–6HOPs (check the “Average
AS path length” and “Average address weighted AS path
length” entries in [2]). To be conservative, we consider
a 10-domain path, where each HOP puts on average an
ambitious 1000 packets per aggregate and samples 1% of
the path’s packets. Given receipt size (22 bytes), this path
will incur an overhead of 0.2 bytes per packet; assuming
400 bytes per packet, this leads to a 0.046% bandwidth
overhead for the path.
Click Implementation As a proof of concept, we con-
figured an eight-core Intel Nehalem server as a standard
IPv4 router and fed to it a real trace. Then we mea-
sured the router’s performance with and without our VPM
modules loaded and saw no difference (in both cases,
the server routed 25Gbps). This is not surprising, given
that, when fed realistic traffic, a Nehalem server is bottle-
necked at the I/O, whereas our VPM modules burden the
CPU.
7.2 Quality
Methodology We consider the case where domain X
from Figure 1 is congested, and X’s delay performance
is estimated from its receipts. Each experiment consists
of: (1) extracting a packet sequence Sˆ from one of our
traces and consider the case where Sˆ is sent through do-
main X ; (2) simulating a scenario where the intra-domain
path between HOPs 4 and 5 is congested; (3) generating
the receipts that X would generate for packet sequence
Sˆ; (4) estimating X’s performance as a verifier would es-
timate it based on X’s receipts, i.e., using the technique
from [20]. (5) comparing that to X’s actual performance.
For step 1, we use traces provided by CAIDA, collected
in 2008 from a Tier-1 ISP. When we say that we “extract a
packet sequence” from a trace, we mean that we extract all
packets that carry a given source and destination origin-
prefix pair. The point of using real traces is to verify that
our sampling and aggregation algorithms work well given
an actual packet stream—e.g., when a domain chooses its
sampling threshold so as to sample 1% of the observed
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Figure 2: The accuracy with which domain X’s delay perfor-
mance is estimated as a function of X’s sampling rate, for dif-
ferent levels of loss, when X uses our sampling algorithm. Con-
gestion is caused by a bursty, high-rate UDP flow.
traffic, it indeed samples 1%. The results we show corre-
spond to a particular packet sequence (of 100, 000 packets
per second), but all traces and packet sequences we tried
gave us consistent results.
For step 2, we “introduce” loss and delay in the cho-
sen packet sequence. To introduce loss, we discard a
subset of the packets, chosen using the Gilbert-Elliot loss
model [9]. Introducing delay is more complicated, as we
are not aware of any commonly acceptable delay model
for Internet traffic. Instead, we use the NS simulator to
create realistic congestion scenarios, and generate the se-
quence of delay values that our packet sequence would
encounter in each case. We consider different congestion
scenarios, where long-lived TCP or UDP flows compete
for/saturate the bandwidth of a bottleneck link, but show
results only for the scenario that introduced the highest
delay variance in the shortest time scale.
Accuracy of Estimated Delay By reducing its sam-
pling rate, a VPM domain can reduce the amount of re-
sources it spends sampling, at the cost of its delay per-
formance being estimated with lower accuracy. We now
examine this trade-off.
We run a set of experiments where we vary domainX’s
sampling rate. Figure 2 (consider the “No loss” curve)
shows the accuracy with which X’s delay performance
is estimated, as a function of the sampling rate. We see
that, reducing the sampling rate results in smooth accu-
racy degradation. Even if X samples only 0.1% of the
observed traffic, its delay performance is estimated with
sub-millisecond accuracy.
Next, we examine how packet loss affects our sampling
algorithm, hence the accuracy with which a VPM do-
main’s delay performance is estimated. We run a set of
experiments where we vary both X’s sampling rate and
the amount of packet loss introduced by X . Figure 2
shows how accuracy degrades with lower sampling rate,
for different loss values. We see that, when X samples
1% of the observed traffic and 25% of this traffic is lost
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Figure 3: The granularity at which domain X’s loss perfor-
mance is computed as a function of the loss rate introduced by
X , when X uses our aggregation algorithm.
within X , X’s delay performance is still estimated with
an accuracy of 2 msec. This robustness in the face of loss
is partly due to our sampling algorithm and partly owed
to the estimation algorithm from [20] (which works well
even with few samples).
Granularity of Computed Loss We now examine how
packet loss affects the granularity at which a VPM do-
main’s loss performance is computed.
We run a set of experiments where we fix X’s aggre-
gation rate (such that it produces one aggregate every
100, 000 packets) and vary the amount of packet loss in-
troduced by X . Figure 2 shows the granularity at which
X’s loss performance can be computed, as a function
of the loss rate. We see that, when there is no loss,
X’s loss performance can be computed over 1sec peri-
ods (because X produces a new aggregate every 100, 000
packets, which, for the particular packet sequence we are
considering, corresponds to 1 sec). As the level of loss
increases, granularity worsens—i.e., a verifier that col-
lects X’s receipts cannot always compute X’s loss per-
formance over 1sec periods. However, the degradation
is, again, smooth: even if X loses 25% of the observed
traffic, its loss performance is computable over periods
of 1.5sec. This robustness in the face of loss is due to
our aggregation algorithm, which maximizes the number
of common aggregates across HOPs—essentially enables
HOPs not to fall “out of sync” when packets get lost.
Verifiability We have demonstrated that a VPM do-
main’s loss and delay performance can be accurately es-
timated from its receipts, even when the domain samples
1% of the observed traffic, puts hundreds of thousands of
packets into a single aggregate, and is severely congested
(to the point of losing more than 25% of the observed
traffic). The next question is, can such a domain’s per-
formance also be verified with this same quality, i.e, will
the domain be caught if it lies?
The answer depends, of course, on how many resources
the domain’s neighbors devote to sampling and aggrega-
tion. Suppose, for instance, that domain L from Figure 1
collects receipts from X and N . Figure 2 gives some con-
crete numbers: If X samples at 1% and loses 25% of the
observed traffic, L can estimate X’s delay performance
with accuracy 2msec. If N samples at the same rate, L
can also verify X’s performance with the same accuracy.
However, if N samples at 0.1%, then L can only verify
X’s delay performance with accuracy 5msec.
To summarize, a VPM domain’s choice of sampling
and aggregation rate determines, first, with what quality
its own performance can be estimated by its customers
and peers; second, to what extent its receipts can be used
to verify the performance of its neighbors.
8 Discussion and Related Work
Partial Deployment If domain X in path P has not de-
ployed VPM, but its neighbors have, then X’s neighbors
are free to blame their performance problems on X (since
X does not produce any receipts to refute their claims).
We view this as an incentive for deployment: a domain
has to report on its performance in order to prevent its
neighbors from blaming their problems on it. Conversely,
if X is the only domain in P that has deployed VPM, its
performance reports may not be verified by its neighbors,
but they are still verifiable. So, during a congestion in-
cident, X can still position itself as the “good” ISP that
provides troubleshooting information to its customers—it
is not its fault that the other ISPs on the path are not up to
the task. X can even use this as an incentive to encour-
age multi-network customers to connect all their networks
through X—since that way they avoid domains that do
not provide troubleshooting information.
Related Work The Packet Obituaries protocol [3] and
the fault-localization protocols from [11] inform traffic
sources where individual packets get lost or corrupted.
AudIt provides source domains with similar per-TCP-
flow information [4]. VPM is similar to these protocols
in that it relies on in-path elements collecting and ex-
porting traffic statistics; it also borrows the concept of
report consistency from AudIt. VPM’s novel elements
are delay-sampling and tunable reporting; based on these
techniques, it avoids the overheads necessary for collect-
ing and propagating per-packet or per-flow state, while
maintaining the verifiability property.
In Trajectory Sampling, routers within an ISP sample
packets using a hash function and record their digests,
with the purpose of inferring the internal paths (sequences
of routers) followed by packets [8]. The Lossy Differ-
ence Aggregator enables two monitoring points to mea-
sure the loss and average delay between them by main-
taining packet counts and average timestamps for packet
aggregates [15]. We use ideas from both protocols (hash-
based sampling, per-aggregate counts), but, as explained
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in Section 3, none of them could provide the computabil-
ity and verifiability properties necessary in our context.
The “Secure Sampling” technique from [12] is useful
when two entities, say Alice and Bob, want to measure
the delay of the path between them by considering only a
sample of the packets they exchange. To prevent interme-
diate nodes from treating the samples preferentially, Alice
and Bob agree on which packets to sample in such a way
that the intermediate nodes cannot guess which are the
samples. This technique is clearly not applicable to our
problem: we are not looking to hide the samples from the
intermediate nodes, we are looking to force the intermedi-
ate nodes to sample honestly—in our context, the entities
that perform the sampling (the domains) are precisely the
ones that may bias the samples.
The “Secure Sketch” technique from [12] enables Al-
ice and Bob to detect when the packets they exchange
are lost, delayed, or modified beyond a certain level. To
this end, both Alice and Bob maintain a sketch (in some
sense, a summary) of all the packets they have exchanged;
at the end, Alice sends her sketch to Bob, who com-
pares the sketches and detects whether any of the above
problems occurred. This technique is related to VPM in
the same way with the Lossy Difference Aggregator: we
could combine it with the strawman to build a mechanism
that determines whether each domain modified packets
beyond a certain level; however, it would not enable the
estimation of delay quantiles.
Finally, VPM can be viewed as a “performance ac-
countability mechanism,” which holds domains account-
able for their performance. An economic analysis has
showed that such a performance accountability mecha-
nism would foster ISP competition and innovation [16].
9 Conclusions
We have presented VPM, a system by which network do-
mains can estimate and verify each other’s loss and delay
performance. VPM relies on domains producing and ex-
changing receipts for the traffic they receive and deliver.
A domain can estimate a neighbor’s performance by pro-
cessing the receipts produced by the neighbor; it can ver-
ify that the neighbor’s receipts are honest by comparing
them to the receipts produced by other domains for the
same traffic. If a domain lies about its performance, that
leads to receipt inconsistencies and exposes the liar to its
neighbors. VPM comes at the cost of deploying (modest)
new functionality at domain boundaries. The processing,
memory, and bandwidth overhead incurred by a deploy-
ing domain is configurable and independently determined
by the domain.
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